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Abstract
We investigate how economic integration in North America has altered the pattern of foreign
direct investment (FDI) to and from Canada. The theoretical analysis suggests that while the
Canadian-U.S. free trade agreement should generate less FDI, the addition of Mexico in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) produces the opposite e¤ect. The fall in
trade costs results in investment diversion from the U.S. and Canada, yet lower xed costs may
increase FDI even in those countries via an increased incentive to locate production facilities
abroad rather than only domestically. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, we nd that
U.S. FDI in Canada as well as Canadian FDI in the U.S. have expanded disproportionately
since NAFTA, suggesting that the latter e¤ect dominates.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional integration
schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Europe while at
the same time continuing its move towards deepintegration. Many developing countries in Asia
and South America have pursued economic integration amongst themselves (ASEAN, Mercosur)
or have sought free trade agreements with other developed countries or blocs, such as the EU or
the United States. In North America, the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)
was followed quickly by the inclusion of Mexico into a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The latter had been unique at the time as it combined two advanced developed with a
developing country, a phenomenon dubbed the new regionalismby Ethier (1998).
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important e¤ects on international economic
interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements has focused on their impact on trade
ows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the partners in the agreement) and
trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement). However, economic integration
and its coincident reduction in trade barriers also alter the incentives for rms when making their
location decisions. Motta and Norman (1996) show that economic integration may increase the
incentive of rms from countries outside of the agreement to locate in the lowest cost country
inside the free trade area (FTA). But they also show that rms from inside the FTA benet from
the increased market size due to increased economies of scale. Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2007)
show that in the case of NAFTA the latter e¤ect dominates the former with respect to foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Mexico.
A corollary of increased FDI in the low-cost country is its diversion from the other countries
which become relatively less attractive locations. This would be true for FDI originating in FTA
partners as well as from outside the FTA. For NAFTA, this would mean a decline in FDI in
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both Canada and the U.S. However, trade agreements not only reduce trade, but also investment
costs. NAFTAs chapter 11 contains specic investment provisions that are largely geared toward
guaranteeing foreign investors the same treatment as domestic investors. These provisions go further
than those contained in the earlier CUSFTA, which in turn relaxed Canadian rules governing foreign
investment. They can be viewed as essentially reducing the initial, xed cost of foreign investment.
These lower costs in turn raise the incentive for rms that may not have been engaged abroad before
to consider foreign production locations. Thus, it becomes an empirical question whether the foreign
investment diversion or the FDI creation e¤ect dominates for countries within an agreement that
are not the low-cost location.
This papers focus is on studying the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canadian inward and outward in-
vestment. Of primary interest is investment in and from the partner countries, although the e¤ect
on investment from countries outside of the agreement is investigated as well.1 In doing so, we
also need to take into consideration that Canada had entered into CUSFTA only ve years prior to
NAFTA. This implies that trade as well as investment costs between Canada and the United States
were lowered before these were lowered in Mexico. Consequently, we analyze a two-step reduction
in these costs in our theoretical model and generate predictions for the di¤erential e¤ects these
reductions have for Canadian FDI.
We use a three-country model similar to Grossman et al. (2006). In contrast to them, we model
one large Northern country and two small countries, one in the North and one in the South, and
then analyze the e¤ect of regional integration on rmslocation decisions. The model predicts that
economic integration between the two Northern countries only with no decline in investment costs
results in decreased FDI due to a decline in the incentive for tari¤-jumping. When the Southern
country is added with not only a decline in trade costs but also declines in investment costs, FDI
1We do not consider Mexicos outward FDI since it is negligible and data on early years are largely missing.
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in the entire region by the member countries increases. First, medium productivity Northern rms
switch from using the other Northern country to using the South as an export platform, especially
in components production. Second, even though there is a decline in FDI in Northern countries by
low productivity rms due to lower trade costs, lower investment costs make investing in these high
cost countries attractive for medium and high productivity rms, particularly in assembly. Since
the level of production by low productivity rms is small due to their ine¢ ciency, the negative
diversion e¤ect is dominated by the positive FDI creation e¤ect and investment in the region as a
whole rises.
The empirical analysis uses aggregate FDI data from 1980 to 2002 and covers the largest feasible
sample of bilateral FDI. Unfortunately, we have no rm level information and likewise, industry
level information that would at a minimum cover Mexico, Canada and the U.S. is not available
on a comparable basis for this time period. Still, we believe that how economic integration of
this kind, rst the traditional North-North, then the new North-South, a¤ects small Northern
countries in the aggregate is of interest to academics and policy makers alike and has not been
studied su¢ ciently. As far as the e¤ect of NAFTA on FDI is concerned, most existing studies
either focus on Mexico alone, such as Waldkirch (2003) or Cuevas et al. (2005), or the U.S. and
Mexico, ignoring Canada, such as our companion paper (Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch 2007). Hejazi
and Pauly (2005) examine the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canada, although they use a simple gravity
framework and analyze U.S. outward FDI and OECD bilateral inward FDI separately, making their
results not strictly comparable to ours, as we discuss in more detail below.
We nd that since the start of economic integration in North America, Canadian FDI in the
U.S. and U.S. FDI in Canada has increased by more than what can be explained by the usual
determinants of FDI such as market size, factor cost di¤erences or exchange rates and relative
to the rise in FDI elsewhere. Due to the relative short time period that only CUSFTA was in
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e¤ect before the addition of Mexico, it is di¢ cult to separately identify the e¤ects of the di¤erent
stages of integration. Still, these results suggest that overall, the investment cost lowering e¤ect
of integration dominates the investment diverting one from lowering trade barriers and adding a
low-cost country. There is some, albeit weak, evidence that Canadian FDI in Mexico has not been
positively a¤ected by NAFTA, despite an increase in the absolute amount of FDI that can be
observed after 1994. This may be due to xed costs in the South remaining high relative to market
size, which adversely a¤ects the location decision of rms in the smaller Northern country.
We also nd robust evidence that the FDI-increasing e¤ect among Northern NAFTA countries
does not apply to non-NAFTA FDI in Canada, which is negatively a¤ected, suggesting a diversion
e¤ect for this type of FDI. Still, overall our results suggest that adding low-cost countries to existing
agreements among industrialized countries, such as the EUs eastward expansion, does not imply
reduced FDI in the original countries, not even the smaller ones, from partner countries. While
FDI in the new members is likely to increase, such a rise need not come at the expense of FDI in
existing members but rather, the total increase in FDI in the region benets all countries, at least
as far as intra-regional FDI is concerned.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be very robust. We carefully correct for both
country-pair specic autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis. We
use skill data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, for example, Carr et al.
(2001), but also the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, for example, Blonigen et al.
(2003). The results are also robust to the consideration of an announcement e¤ect since both
CUSFTA and NAFTA were anticipated before their formal inception.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the evolution of Canadian FDI policies.
The following section discusses the theoretical implications of our three-country model on the
location choice of rms. The following section presents the empirical model which is designed to
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allow testing of the main hypotheses generated by the theory. After a discussion of our econometric
approach and the data, the empirical results are presented, followed by concluding remarks.
2 Canadian FDI Policies
Globerman and Shapiro (1999) provide a nice overview of foreign investment policies in Canada.
The rst major change occurred in the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), which was enacted
in 1973. It required a detailed review of new foreign investments in Canada, where foreign investors
had to show that the investment would be of signicant benet to Canada in order to receive
approval. These were signicant additional burdens that should have a¤ected FDI. In 1985, the
Investment Canada Act relaxed these stringent review rules. In particular, greeneld investments
in certain sectors were no longer subject to review at all. For many others, only a notication, no
review was required.
While the Canada-U.S. FTA in 1989 further relaxed investment rules for investors in the part-
ner country, it stopped short of according national treatment for all investments. In particular,
investments exceeding a certain threshold, $CDN 150 million at the time, still required a review.
NAFTA, going into e¤ect in January of 1994, went much further than CUSFTA with respect
to FDI regulations. It contains a provision to grant national treatment to foreign investors from
partner countries. In addition, it codies the most favored nation principle in that signatory states
must be accorded at least the same favorable treatment as any other country. NAFTA does allow
the use of negative lists, the exclusion of certain sectors from liberalization. However, even this
can be argued to foster transparency as exceptions are made explicit and are not subject to an
approval process that may potentially deny any investment in any sector. In practice, the major
exceptions were nancial services and culture and media.2 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue
2For a detailed discussion of NAFTAs investment provision, see Graham and Wilkie (1994).
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that it took until NAFTA for foreign investment regulations to be relaxed substantially enough for
investment costs to fall signicantly.3
There are also a few sector-specic policies that could a¤ect FDI. Chief among them are the
U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement of 1965 (Autopact) and the National Energy
Program of 1980 (NEP). The Autopact not only reduced trade barriers in assembled cars and car
parts, but also mandated production capacity shares of U.S. automakers in Canada, thus raising
FDI in this sector, although well before the FTA and NAFTA and the beginning of our sample
period. The NEP a¤ects mainly oil and gas exploration, giving preference to Canadian rms, thus
reducing FDI. However, these restrictions were also eased in the wake of NAFTA.
3 The Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
In this section we present a variation of the three-country model of Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl
(2006) -from now on GHS. They examine the location strategies of heterogeneous multinational
rms in a three-country setting and do not consider economic integration e¤ects, so we extend and
re-interpret their model for our case.
Economic integration will a¤ect both trade (tari¤and transportation) costs and the xed costs of
establishing operations abroad. The former is a standard feature of trade agreements and formalized
in specic reductions of both tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers. The latter may result as a consequence
of loosening regulations governing foreign investment as described in the previous section. Thus,
we model both, which generates interesting hypotheses regarding the FDI e¤ects of CUSFTA and
NAFTA with respect to the location decisions of U.S. and Canadian rms.
In this model, rms choose between domestic production and undertaking foreign direct in-
3For a dissenting view see Buckley et al. (2007) who argue that the fundamental policy environment did not
change since the 1989 treaty, although they do acknowledge a potential e¤ect on FDI stemming from the expanded
geographic area of NAFTA.
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vestment to save either production or trading costs. Assembly activities, which result in nished
products, and intermediate activities, which result in inputs used in assembly, are di¤erentiated.
Consumption. Households consume J + 1 products produced by J di¤erentiated goods sectors
and one homogeneous good sector. Consumers share identical preferences which can be represented
as
U = x0 +
JX
j=1
1
j
j
j
X
j
j ; 0 < j < 1 (1)
where x0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good and X
j
j is an index of consumption
of the di¤erentiated goods produced by industry j 2 f1; :::Jg: This index is a CES aggregate of
amounts of di¤erent varieties consumed.4
Markets. There are three markets: Canada (C), the U.S. (U) and Mexico (M). Firms in the
Northern countries are more productive than those in the Southern country in the homogeneous
good production. Therefore, Northern country wages are higher than the Southern country ones.
Formally, wC = wU = 1 > wM = w; where w` is the wage rate in country `: The homogeneous
good is produced in all three countries in equilibrium and taken to be the numeraire. The sizes of
these markets for the di¤erentiated products are di¤erent. Let M ` be the number of households in
country ` that consume di¤erentiated products. We assume that MC = MM < MU : We further
assume that producers of di¤erentiated goods are from the Northern countries and they must locate
their headquarter activities at home, following Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2007). Di¤erent from
them we allow for a market in Mexico for the goods produced by multinationals.
Demand. The demand in market ` is given by
x` =  =(1 )M `(X`)( )=(1 )(p`) 1=(1 ) (2)
4Xj =
24njZ
0
xj(i)
jdi
35xj(i) ; where 0 < j < 1; xj(i) is the consumption of the ith variety of industry j
and nj is the number of varieties in that industry. Given equation (1), the elasticity of substitution within j
is 1=1 j :We assume that j > j ; in other words, there is a higher degree of substitution within industry
than among industries.
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where X` is an aggregate consumption index for varieties in the industry in country `; and p`
is the price charged in country `.
Production. Productivity levels in industry j are independent draws from the cumulative dis-
tribution function Gj(). A rms production function in industry j is Fj(m;a), where m is the
intermediate goods -or components- used in the production of the nal good and a is the level of
assembly activity. Fj() is an increasing and concave function with constant returns to scale. The
elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods production m and the assembly activity
a is less than 1.
Production Costs. Let cj(pm; pa) be the unit cost function dual to Fj(m;a), where pm and pa
are the e¤ective prices (inclusive of delivery costs) of intermediate goods and assembly activity,
respectively. Thus, cj(pm; pa)= is the per-unit variable cost of production for a rm with pro-
ductivity . A rm that chooses to produce intermediate goods in a di¤erent location from its
headquarters bears a xed cost of gj units of home labor. On the other hand, if the assembly
activity is undertaken in a di¤erent place than the headquarters, the rm incurs a xed cost of fj
units of home labor. These xed costs are assumed to be independent of the foreign location. That
is, a U.S. rm does not bear a di¤erent xed cost when it chooses to produce its intermediates
(assembly activity) in Mexico rather than Canada. Since 1 unit of m requires 1 unit of local labor
in the place where intermediates are produced and 1 unit of a requires 1 unit of local labor in the
assembly location, Mexico enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of both components
and nal goods relative to the production of the homogeneous good.
Trade Costs. Iceberg trade costs could apply to both intermediate and nal goods. We will,
however, focus on costly nal goods trade only.5 A rm in industry j must ship tj  1 units of
the nal good to deliver one unit of that good to the nal consumption destination. A rm with
5See GHS for a brief treatment of costly intermediate goods trade.
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headquarters in C(U) will never produce the intermediates in U(C). Such a rm would instead
produce the intermediates in M , ship them costlessly to the assembly plant and thus achieve lower
variable costs while incurring the same xed costs. Moreover, there is no justication for a rm to
produce the intermediates in two locations due to the costless shipping of these goods. Therefore,
the production of intermediates will be realized either in C(U) or M but not both.
Given the full structure of the model, it is now easy to calculate the variable costs of a rm in
industry j that opts for di¤erent location strategies. For example, a Canadian rm with productivity
 that wants to deliver nal goods to consumers in the U.S. can produce and assemble the good in
Canada and pay tjcj(1; 1)= per unit, whereas it would pay tjcj(w;w)= per unit to conduct all its
operations in Mexico. Another possibility for this Canadian rm is to produce the components in
Mexico and perform the assembly in the U.S. and thus pay tjcj(w; 1)= per unit.
Operating Prots. For any strategy with a xed cost of k and unit variable cost of c= the
maximized operating prots are
 = (1  )Yc =(1 )   k (3)
where  = =(1 ) is a transformed measure of productivity and Y  M `(X`)( )=(1 ) is
the size of the entire regions demand. We shall assume that Y C = YM < Y U , i.e., the U.S. is
the large country among all three, and the share of Mexican or Canadian demand in the regions
demand is =2 = Y C=Y = YM=Y where  2 (0; 1):6
3.1 Pre-CUSFTA
We begin our analysis with a regime of relatively high trade costs (inclusive of tari¤ and transporta-
tion costs) and high xed costs of FDI among all three countries, which is a good approximation of
6Di¤erent from GHS we assume that Mexico and Canada are of equal size and smaller than the U.S. This
assumption simplies the analysis without a¤ecting the major conclusions described below. Moreover, Canadian and
Mexican GDP are not very di¤erent. For example, purchasing power adjusted GDP in 2006 was $1.27 trillion in
Mexico and $1.20 trillion in Canada, according to the World Banks World Development Indicators.
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the time before CUSFTA.7 We concentrate on rms in a particular industry j; and to reduce the
clutter in the notation we drop the subscript j from now on. We assume that
tH >
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(4)
where tH denotes a high level of trade costs. We will use superscript H(L) to denote the
high(low) level of a variable from now on. When trade costs are this high, the lowest cost of serving
any market is assembling the nal product in the consumption location to conserve the shipping
costs including tari¤s. To see this, notice that if intermediates are produced in M and assembled
in C(U), the unit variable cost of serving C(U) is at most c(w; 1). However, the unit variable cost
of serving the same market from a plant in M is at least tc(w;w) which is obviously higher given
inequality (2).
Next, observe that if the intermediates are produced in C(U), the cost of serving C(U) from an
assembly plant there is at most c(1; 1), whereas serving C(U) from an assembly plant in U(C) is
at least tc(1; 1) and from an assembly plant in M is at least tc(1; w). As long as c(w; 1)=c(w;w) >
c(1; 1)=c(1; w)8, inequality (2) also satises tc(1; w) > c(1; 1). Therefore, each market is served at
the lowest cost through assembly in the same market. No rm will choose to assemble in one foreign
location only and export to both home and the other country. In other words, export platform FDI
as analyzed in Ekholm et al. (2003) is not a possibility in this high trade cost regime.
This leaves us with a total of eight potential location strategies: home or Mexican production
of intermediate goods with assembly either in home, or in home and in Mexico, or in home and in
the other Northern country or in all three countries.
Next, we compare the operating prots under these alternative strategies. Since we assume
asymmetry between the two Northern countries, di¤erent from GHS we have to consider two sub-
7This is a case we use as our benchmark and corresponds to the high trade costs scenario of GHS.
8c(w; 1)=c(w;w) > c(1; 1)=c(1; w) holds if and only if log c(pm; pa) is submodular. When the elasticity of
substitution between m and a is less than one, as we have assumed, the submodularity is guaranteed.
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cases within each regime; one for Canada and one for the U.S. as the source of FDI. The maximum
attainable prots for all dominant strategies in each regime for each rm are given in Table 1.
The set of possible location strategies when a C rm invests involves six elements: fC;Cg;
fC;UCg; fC;UCMg; fM;Cg; fM;UCg; and fM;UCMg. The rst element in brackets is the
location of components production and the second one is (are) the location(s) of assembly. Notice
that no C rm will use M as an export platform to U in this high trade cost regime since that
strategy is dominated by assembling in C and U as long as the size of market U in the region is
greater than 1=3.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the combinations of xed costs of FDI in components, g and
productivity levels,  that give rise to di¤erent optimal location strategies for a Canadian rm in
the pre-CUSFTA regime. The lines in the gure represent the boundaries between regions with
di¤erent optimal location strategies. In the region fM;Cg; for example, components are produced
in M and shipped costlessly to C for assembly. The nal product is consumed locally and also
exported to M and U . The gure is drawn for a particular value of xed costs of FDI in assembly,
f . When f changes, the boundaries between the regions shift.9 FDI in assembly takes place to the
right of the dashed lines in the gure.
For all positive values of g, rms with low productivity conduct all their production activities
at home and export the nal product to the U.S. and Mexico. The level of output produced by
these rms is relatively small because the variable cost savings through FDI do not compensate
for the high xed costs of FDI. Firms with intermediate levels of productivity may engage in
FDI in components or in assembly depending upon the size of g. They will engage in intra-rm
trade besides exporting nal output from Canada or from an export platform in the U.S. Notice
9We followed the details provided in the appendix of GHS in the construction of these boundaries. The
idea is simple. The boundary between fM;Cg and fM;UCg, for example, is dened by the values that g
takes for each  value when M;C = M;UC . In this particular case, the boundary is vertical because both
strategies involve FDI in components and thus the boundary does not depend on g. Detailed calculations of
our boundaries and their shifts in di¤erent regimes are available upon request.
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that high trade costs and the bigger size of the U.S. market encourage rms to undertake FDI in
assembly there rather than the low cost but small Mexico. Firms with high productivity levels
go for complete globalization in which they set up assembly plants in all three countries and thus
engage in horizontal FDI in all three countries.
The set of possible location strategies when the investing rm is from U involves six elements:
fU;Ug; fU;UMg; fU;UCMg; fM;Ug; fM;UMg; and fM;UCMg. Observe that, di¤erent from
the previous case, no U rm will use C as an export platform toM sinceM is the low cost location
with the same size market as C and the same level of FDI xed costs.
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the di¤erent possible location strategies when the investing
rm is from the U.S. The intersection points of the boundaries in the U.S. case are drawn exactly
the same as the Canadian case for convenience. The productivity levels corresponding to the inter-
section points can be di¤erent from the Canadian case, although the ordering of these productivity
levels and thus the intuition are not. This is true for all three regimes discussed in this paper.
As in the case of a Canadian rm, the low productivity rms prefer not to engage in FDI in
assembly and high productivity rms conduct horizontal FDI in all markets. Firms with interme-
diate productivity levels originating from the U.S., on the other hand, have their assembly line set
up in Mexico rather than Canada.
3.2 CUSFTA
In this subsection we concentrate on the case where trade costs between only the two Northern
countries are reduced, reecting the drop in tari¤ barriers between Canada and the U.S., while
those barriers between Mexico and the two Northern countries remain high. We also assume no
decline in the xed costs of investing in this regime. In particular,
c(1; 1)
c(1; w)
< tL <
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(5)
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tH >
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(6)
where tL is the reduced trade costs between C and U and tH is the high trade costs between
M and the other two countries.10 We assume that the relative decline in trade costs are bounded
both from below and above to ensure a moderate level of decline.11
In this scenario there are again six location strategies to consider. The di¤erence between
the optimal location strategies in pre-CUSFTA and CUSFTA regimes for Canada and thus our
rst three testable hypotheses can be derived by comparing Figures 1 and 2. All hypotheses are
formulated with respect to aggregate FDI, even though the model is one of heterogeneous rms.
This is because we only have comparable economy-wide data for the three NAFTA countries as
well as FDI in and between all other countries which serve as our control group (for details, see the
next section).
Hypothesis 1 Canadian FDI in the U.S. declines after CUSFTA.
Compare the left panels of Figures 1 and 2. High productivity Canadian rms continue to
produce and sell close to the customers and maintain their investments in the U.S. Low productivity
rms continue to produce at home and export to the other two countries as before but now they
are able to expand their production to export more to the U.S. due to the lower trade costs. Notice
that region fC;Cg increases in size. The medium productivity rms, on the other hand, behave
much more di¤erently. Observe that regions fC;UCg and fM;UCg shrink in size. Trade costs are
low enough for the rms at the lower end of the medium productivity range to invest in the home
country and export, rather than to invest in the assembly line in the U.S. Given the same level of
10 Inequality (5) corresponds to the moderate transport case of GHS. Since CUSFTA reduced tari¤ barriers
but not necessarily transportation costs, we opt for not using their low transport cost scenario.
11 In particular, C(1;1)C(1;w) <
TH
TL
< T
HTL(1 )+TL=2 TH(1 )
THTL=2
:
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production costs in Canada and the U.S., now they are able to avoid xed costs of assembly in the
U.S. In other words, the need for tari¤-jumping FDI declines after CUSFTA.
Hypothesis 2 Canadian FDI in Mexico declines after CUSFTA.
High productivity Canadian rms continue to produce and sell close to the customers and main-
tain their investments in Mexico. Observe that FDI in components in Mexico by low and medium
level productivity Canadian rms decline after CUSFTA. Due to lower trade costs, Canadian rms
are less able to justify the xed costs of components production and thus reduce their FDI in
components in Mexico. That is why we observe a shrinkage in the size of the regions fM;Cg and
fM;UCg.
Hypothesis 3 U.S. FDI declines in Canada after CUSFTA.
Examine the right panels of Figures 1 and 2. The behavior of low and low-end medium produc-
tivity U.S. rms is very similar to the behavior of Canadian rms. They increase their production
of components and assembly in the home country and export to the entire region to benet from
low trade costs. Therefore, the size of region fU;Ug increases. The low-end medium productivity
rms reduce their assembly activity in Mexico once used to supply Canada and instead invest in
the U.S. and export to Canada, while the rest of the medium productivity rms continue to use
Mexico as an export platform.
3.3 NAFTA
In this subsection, we analyze changes in the optimal location strategies when trade costs between
all three countries are as low as indicated in inequality (5). Moreover, we also assume a decline in
the xed costs of both components production and assembly of the nal products as a reasonable
approximation of NAFTA.
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In the NAFTA regime there are only ve location strategies to consider. The set of possible
location strategies when a C rm invests are fC;Cg; fC;CMg; fC;UCMg; fM;Cg; and fM;Mg,
whereas for a U rm they are fU;Ug; fU;UMg; fU;UCMg; fM;Ug; and fM;Mg.12 The di¤erence
between the optimal location strategies in CUSFTA and NAFTA regimes and thus our remaining
testable hypotheses can be derived by comparing Figures 2 and 3 which are depicted for low trade
and xed costs.
Hypothesis 4 Canadian FDI in the U.S. increases after NAFTA.
Even though there is a decline in Canadian FDI in the U.S. by low-end medium productivity
rms due to declining trade costs, the decline in the xed costs of assembly, f , increases Canadian
FDI in the U.S. considerably by the remaining medium productivity and also high productivity
rms. Furthermore, if the decline in f is much more pronounced than the decline in g; then assembly
activity in all countries will go up. This can be shown as a huge downward shift of the positively
sloped boundary between fC;UCMg and fM;Mg. Thus, fC;UCMg may even become the only
optimal choice for all medium and high productivity rms.
Hypothesis 5 Canadian FDI in Mexico increases after NAFTA.
Examine the left panels of Figures 2 and 3. As the trade costs between Canada and Mexico
decrease, even low productivity rms start assembling in Mexico. Notice that region fC;UCg is
replaced by region fC;CM}, that is, medium productivity rms stop using the U.S. as an export
platform and start using Mexico as one. Some of the other medium productivity rms, on the other
hand, engage in full horizontal FDI in all countries, which was not a possibility before.
As g goes down, components production in Mexico by a majority of Canadian rms increases.
Observe that regions fM;UCg and fM;UCMg are replaced by region fM;Mg. When a Canadian
12fM;Mg dominates fM;UCg, fM;UMg and fM;UCMg under NAFTA.
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rm invests in performing any activity in low-cost Mexico, such FDI reduces its unit costs, which
raises the output level, and therefore increases the return to performing other production activities
in Mexico. Reduced trade costs coupled with low levels of xed costs in components make being
close to the nal consumers redundant. Notice that more rms with lesser productivity engage in
FDI in assembly as well when g is low.
Hypothesis 6 U.S. FDI in Canada increases after NAFTA.
Compare the right panels of Figure 2 and 3. U.S. FDI in Canada compared to Canadian FDI
in the U.S. increases even more since there is no decline in U.S. FDI in Canada at all. Any decline
in the xed costs of assembly, f , increases U.S. FDI in Canada considerably by medium and high
productivity rms. As in the case of Canada, if the decline in f is more pronounced than the decline
in g, then fU;UCMg may become the only optimal choice for all medium and high productivity
U.S. rms.
4 The Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to examine the e¤ects of CUSFTA and NAFTA on inward and outward
Canadian FDI by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator which attributes only changes
relative to a control group to the agreements. In addition, to avoid spurious correlations as much
as possible, we include an array of control variables drawn from the existing literature on the
determinants of foreign direct investment such as Brainard (1997), Markusen (1997, 2002), Carr et
al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Blonigen et al. (2003).
We rst outline the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation. Specically, let
FDIijt = +
2P
k=1
kdrk +
4P
l=1
ldhl +
2P
k=1
4P
l=1
kl (drk  dhl) (7)
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where FDIijt is FDI in host country i from source country j at time t; rk denotes the regime
(k = 1 for CUSFTA, k = 2 for NAFTA) and hl denotes host-type, to be explained below. dr1 is a
dichotomous variable that is equal to one if the regime is CUSFTA (from 1989 on) and dr2 equals
one if the regime is NAFTA (1994 and later); both are zero otherwise.13 Note that specifying the
regimes in this manner is consistent with CUSFTA remaining in e¤ect through the addition of
Mexico in NAFTA, where the NAFTA dummy then only represents the e¤ect of that addition, not
the e¤ect of the entire three-country FTA.
dh1   dh4 are dichotomous variables, one for each of four host-source types. Let dh1 equal one
if the U.S. hosts Canadian FDI. Let dh2 equal one if Mexico is the host country to Canadian FDI.
Let dh3 equal one if Canada is the host country to FDI from the U.S., and nally, let dh4 equal
one if Canada is the host to FDI from any non-NAFTA country. We add this last host-source type
-even though it is not formally treated in our theoretical model- for completeness, so that we cover
all FDI relationships involving Canada. We would expect a negative e¤ect of both CUSFTA and
NAFTA on this FDI as the agreements make the U.S. (due to lowered trade costs for exporting to
Canada) and Mexico (due to the lower trade and investment costs) more attractive locations for
non-North American rms.
The estimated impact of CUSFTA and NAFTA, respectively, for a particular host-source re-
lationship is then given by the kls, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators. Since there are four
such relationships and two regimes to consider, there are a total of eight coe¢ cients. For example,
11 gives the di¤erence-in-di¤erences e¤ect of CUSFTA on Canadian FDI in the U.S.; 22 gives the
e¤ect of NAFTA on Canadian FDI in Mexico.
In order to see why the s are of central interest, note that  is the baseline e¤ect for observations
that are pre-CUSFTA and NAFTA (dr1 = dr2 = 0) and are not of a (future) NAFTA host (dhl = 0
13As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of both CUSFTA and NAFTA in consideration of a possible
announcement e¤ect.
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8 l). Then, + k is the e¤ect of CUSFTA/NAFTA on non-NAFTA hosts. The simple di¤erence,
i.e. the CUSFTA-or NAFTA-e¤ectis therefore given by 1 and 2, respectively. For host type
l, the pre- and post-NAFTA e¤ects (and similarly for CUSFTA only) on FDI are given by + l
and +2+ l+ 2l, respectively, with the di¤erence, the NAFTA-e¤ect, being 2+ 2l. Hence,
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate is given by 2l. While the signs, magnitudes and signicance
levels of the kls are going to be of central interest, we will also report the simple di¤erence results.
Two comments on the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator are in order before we
proceed to the other controls included in the empirical model. First, since the e¤ects of NAFTA
that we identify here are all relative to a control group, the identity of the control group matters.
We use the largest control group possible, which includes all bilateral FDI relationships outside of
NAFTA.14 These include U.S. and Canadian outward FDI, although its omission does not a¤ect
the results.15 The second issue pertains to econometric problems in the use of the di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimator as detailed in Bertrand et al. (2004). We discuss how we address these in the
next section.
For other control variables to include in the empirical model, we appeal to the standard FDI
literature. There has been some discussion in the literature about various nonlinear and non-
monotonic relationships between FDI and its determinants (see, for example, Carr et al. (2001,
2003), Blonigen et al. (2003) and Braconier et al. (2005)).16 Since these are not of particular
interest here, we use a simple specication as our base, augmenting the model with the following
14We deal with inward U.S. and inward Mexican FDI other than from Canada in the same manner as described
above, by including appropriate dichotomous variables, but in the interest of clutter and as we have explored these
issues in more depth in our companion paper (Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch 2007), we omit the associated coe¢ cients
from our presentation of the results below.
15Hejazi and Pauly (2005) analyze the e¤ect of NAFTA on U.S. FDI in Canada in a sample of outward U.S. FDI
only. In their analysis of inward FDI, using bilateral OECD data, they do not control explicitly for the U.S. , but
only include a North America dummy and no interactions of that dummy with NAFTA or CUSFTA dummies.
16For a detailed discussion of the knowledge-capital model and its empirical implementation, see Markusens (2002)
book.
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controls:
FDI = f
0BB@ GDP Host;GDP Source; Skill Host; Skill Source;
Real Exchange Rate, Host Openness; Source Openness;Distance
1CCA (8)
The coe¢ cients on the rst two terms, GDP Host and GDP Source, are expected to be positive
as larger market size of both the sending and the receiving country positively a¤ect the scale of
foreign production. The next two terms, Skill Host and Skill Source, which are dened as the
share of skilled workers in the economy, proxy for a countrys endowments with skilled labor. The
literature suggests that countries better endowed with skilled labor are more likely to be headquarter
countries of multinational rms, but since even for relatively unskilled labor intensive production
processes some skilled labor is needed and we observe most FDI between similar countries, the
coe¢ cients on both skill variables are expected to be positive. The real exchange rate, measured
as an index, has been found to matter by some studies on the determinants of FDI (Froot and
Stein, 1991; Blonigen, 1997; Goldberg and Klein, 1997), although its sign can be ambiguous. On
the one hand, a higher real exchange rate of a potential source country makes investment abroad
(in foreign currency) less costly. On the other hand, revenue received in foreign currency is worth
less in home currency, which investors presumably want at some point. If the former dominates, a
positive sign is expected, if the latter, a negative one.
Source country and host country trade costs are measured by the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP, an often used measure for the trade openness of a country. It is used over others because
it is available for the entire sample period.17 The sign on host country trade costs may be positive
or negative. A negative sign would be consistent with the tari¤-jumping argument whereby greater
openness reduces the incentive to produce abroad. A positive sign is consistent with vertical
integration as lower trade costs increase the incentive to ship intermediate goods abroad for nal
17Endogeneity may be a concern with this openness measure. However, other measures such as an index from the
Global Competitiveness Report are highly correlated with any measure of investment cost. In any case, omitting the
openness variables does not change the qualitative results.
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assembly taking place there. As source country trade costs increase the cost of shipping either
intermediates or nal goods back home, a positive sign is expected. Finally, distance is measured
as the distance between country capitals. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy
for both trade and investment costs. It is included since it usually performs well in gravity-type
models.
We should note that ascribing the e¤ects that we nd solely to CUSFTA or NAFTA is clearly
problematic as other events during the time period that we are looking at may a¤ect the pattern
of FDI as well and we have only limited ways to control for those. For example, in addition to
NAFTA, Mexico joined the OECD in 1994, but more importantly, the peso crisis in late 1994, early
1995 led to a steep real depreciation of the peso and a fall in GDP, followed by a real appreciation
in the years afterwards. Our GDP and exchange controls may not su¢ ciently control for the extent
of the crisis and its e¤ect on foreign investors. However, by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimator, we do control for the worldwide rising trend in FDI over the sample period, whatever
its cause.
5 Econometric Considerations and Data
5.1 Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were present. Therefore, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression) with
panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocorrelation coef-
cient is assumed to be di¤erent for each observational unit (country pair). The variance-covariance
matrix is computed under the assumption that the disturbances are heteroscedastic and contempo-
raneously correlated across units, where each pair of cross-sectional units has their own covariance.
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For each element in the covariance matrix, all available observations that are common to the two
units contributing to the covariance are used to compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced.18
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample
period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the e¤ects of CUSFTA
and NAFTA, we need a su¢ ciently long time series. In our base specication, we chose a minimum
of 14 observations for each country pair. In order to implement the correction for autocorrelation,
no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap, we limit ourselves to using post-gap
information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is missing, and 1985 onwards is available,
the data for this country-pair start in 1985. One of the robustness checks uses a larger number of
observations, although a minimum of ve must still be imposed in order to allow for the computation
of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for all country pairs.
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation can lead to severely biased standard errors. While we account for the problem by
estimating a rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient, we also use one of the techniques they suggest
which works well for samples of more than 20 observational units (we have at least 178 country
pairs). It requires estimating standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure
between time periods, using a generalized White-like formula. This estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix is consistent as the number of country pairs tends to innity.
5.2 Data
FDI data come from three sources. U.S. inward and outward FDI data come from the standard
source used in most studies of U.S. FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data
are described in detail elsewhere. Mexican FDI data come from the Mexican National Statistical
18We also ran the regressions under the assumption of a common AR coe¢ cient, which resulted in no qualitative
changes in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results.
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Institute (INEGI). These are FDI stocks in Mexico from 1980 on, published in U.S. dollars. The
data distinguish ten source countries throughout the sample period. They account for about 90
percent of total FDI in Mexico. Since 1994, more source country and especially industry detail is
available, but since we need su¢ cient pre-1994 data, we cannot use the additional detail in this
study. No industry or additional source country detail is available retroactively for the time before
NAFTA. The third data source, used for all other countries, including Canadian FDI in countries
other than the U.S. and Mexico, is the OECDs International Direct Investment Statistics, which
publishes FDI data in U.S. dollars. In the empirical analysis, all nominal values are converted to
real dollars using the U.S. producer price index for capital equipment.19
For most of the countries in the sample, FDI rose modestly during the 1980s and rose much more
substantially during the 1990s. Within North America, the United States is the most important
host country of Canadian FDI and the most important source of both Canadian and Mexican
inward FDI. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of real Canadian inward and outward (in the U.S.
and Mexico) FDI. Note the di¤erent scale for Mexico (on the right), illustrating that the magnitude
of FDI in Mexico is dwarfed by FDI in the U.S.
Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data from
the Penn World Tables (6.2). Trade data come from the same source. An important control variable
in many studies is skill. The two most common sources of skill data are the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee data on schooling. We use both in our analysis to ensure the
robustness of our results. The ILO data measure the number of workers in a particular occupation
and characterize some as skilled, some as unskilled, employing the skill denitions from Carr et al.
(2001). A countrys skill level then is represented by the share of skilled workers. We ll in missing
19FDI among many OECD countries is often available twice as both an OECD source and an OECD host country
report their inward and outward FDI. Inspection of such cases reveals that the numbers do not match. For the results
reported below, we pick the numbers reported by the host country, but note that the results are largely robust to
picking source country FDI instead.
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data using a linear trend between non-missing years. For just a few countries, additional years are
lled in using the growth rate of the skilled labor share between non-missing years. Alternatively,
we use the Barro/Lee data on years of schooling. These are available only in ve-year intervals,
though for a larger number of countries than the ILO data, and we ll in missing values using a
linear trend as well.20
Table 2 contains summary statistics for our basic sample with a minimum of 14 observations
per country pair as well as for the larger sample where only a minimum of ve observations are
required. It is of note that mean FDI far exceeds median FDI, indicating that it is skewed towards
a smaller number of countries. Host countries tend to be larger than source countries, but the latter
have a higher share of skilled labor than the former. Note that expanding the sample lowers average
FDI and GDP, but substantially raises openness and the real exchange rate. Since the additional
countries are small, they tend to have higher degrees of openness, as is typical when measured by
the share of trade in GDP. Moreover, their currencies tend to depreciate signicantly over time.
6 Results
Tables 3 - 6 report the results. Tables 2 (using ILO skill data) and 4 (using Barro/Lee education
data) show regression results for the control variables and some of the coe¢ cients on the dichoto-
mous variables, for a variety of specications. Tables 4 and 6 present the simple di¤erence and the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation results, which are of central interest.
The basic sample contains only source-host country pairs for which we have at least 14 observa-
tions. Specication (3) in Table 3 includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases
the sample size from 3,317 to 7,357 observations. However, many of the newly included country
pairs still have twelve or 13 observations. Specication (4) accounts for a possible announcement
20Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results.
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e¤ect by starting the CUSFTA and NAFTA regime dummies in 1987 and 1992, respectively, rather
than 1989 or 1994.21 Specication (5) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix as sug-
gested by Bertrand et al. (2004) in order to address potential bias in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation.
The rst specication is one that only includes the dichotomous variables needed for the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation without any controls. The signicantly positive and large coef-
cients on both dummies indicating U.S. FDI in Canada and Canadian FDI in the U.S. illustrate
that even before NAFTA and CUSFTA, bilateral FDI between these countries was unusually high.
Interestingly, however, this result only holds up for inward Canadian FDI from the U.S., not Cana-
dian FDI in the U.S., once we include additional controls in column (2), and that is also robust
across the other specications in the table. Almost all control variables are highly statistically
signicant and have the expected signs. Market size, both of the host and the source, has a positive
e¤ect on FDI, as does the share of skilled workers in the economy. This illustrates that multi-
nationals from large countries with abundant skilled labor tend to dominate. The real exchange
rate is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in any specication, indicating that it does not tend to
a¤ect FDI at such an aggregate level. Host and source country openness are statistically signicant
(except in column (5)). The positive coe¢ cient on host openness is in contrast to the tari¤-jumping
argument, but supports the vertical integration hypothesis. The negative sign on source country
openness, however, is not consistent with expectations. Finally, distance is a deterrent of FDI.
Table 4 shows the results of the e¤ects of CUSFTA and NAFTA, both in absolute terms and
relative to the evolution of FDI elsewhere in the world (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator).
The order of host type results follows the order of the hypotheses from the theoretical section, with
the addition of non-NAFTA countriesFDI in Canada. Note that the statistical signicance of
21Dating the announcement e¤ect to 1988 and 1993 makes little di¤erence to the results.
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the results with respect to a particular host type and regime is very robust across specications.
This is also true for the simple di¤erence and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results. However, the
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients, which represent millions of dollars since the estimation is in levels,
do di¤er somewhat and we put these di¤erences in perspective below.
Recall that the theory predicts that the fall in trade costs due to CUSFTA should lower intra-
agreement FDI as well as Canadian FDI in Mexico. However, only Canadian FDI in Mexico is
shown to be signicantly negatively a¤ected, though consistently so across specications. Intra-
CUSFTA FDI is only marginally signicant in specication (5), though with an unexpected positive
sign. Thus, we can conrm one of the three hypotheses for CUSFTA only.
The e¤ect of the agreement on other countriesFDI in Canada is strongly negative and very
robust across specications. This suggests that with easier access to the Canadian market from the
U.S., FDI may have been re-oriented to the U.S., with its far larger market.
With respect to the addition of Mexico to the existing CUSFTA agreement (NAFTA), the
theory predicts a positive e¤ect for intra-agreement FDI among all countries. The results are
mixed, however. Canadian FDI in the U.S. as well as U.S. FDI in Canada have positive coe¢ cients
across all specications, but they are only marginally signicant in a few of the Prais-Winsten
regressions, although strongly signicant, and much larger, when we compute an arbitrary VCE
instead. Thus, there is evidence that lower investment costs expanded FDI generally as they make
foreign engagement more attractive and that this e¤ect dominates the reduced incentive for tari¤-
jumping.
In order to get a sense of the total economic e¤ect, we can relate the estimated e¤ect of both
CUSFTA and NAFTA to the level of FDI reached by the end of our sample period (2002). For
U.S. FDI in Canada, the range is from about 20 to 30 percent, a considerable e¤ect. That is, the
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model suggests that 20 to 30 percent of the 2002 FDI stock has resulted from the two agreements.22
For Canadian FDI in the U.S., the e¤ect is even larger, ranging from 28.6 to nearly 40 percent,
depending on specication. We caution, however, that while all coe¢ cients are positive, statistical
signicance is not always achieved.
The negative impact on Canadian FDI in Mexico found under CUSFTA only is conrmed
for NAFTA to some extent, though note that only one of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results that
includes control variables is statistically signicant, It is the one that considers a possible announce-
ment e¤ect, which e¤ectively includes two CUSFTA-only years. Still, the result is somewhat puz-
zling as it is not only contrary to theoretical expectations, but also in stark contrast to the evolution
of the absolute amount of FDI, which rose substantially after 1994. However, if we compare its
magnitude to that of, for example, Canadian FDI in the U.S., it is much smaller. The estimated
e¤ect is also unreasonably large in magnitude, on the order of more than 90 up to over 200 percent
of 2002 FDI.
As did CUSFTA, NAFTA is robustly shown to have had a negative e¤ect on other countriesFDI
in Canada, which is statistically signicant in every specication. Putting the estimated coe¢ cients
in relation to 2002 FDI, the agreements resulted in a 10 to over 22 percent lower amount. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that for other countries, access to the Canadian market from either
the U.S. or Mexico has been greatly facilitated with the lower trade costs, provided rules of origin
are satised. The additional reduction in investment costs in Mexico in particular reinforces this
investment diversion away from Canada.23
Despite some di¤erences in the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects, the qualitative results are
22Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted
FDI stocks is in the neighborhood of 0.55, statistically signicant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies
(2004) nd that in their data, the residuals are unreasonably large and di¤er systematically between rich and poor
countries. Our residuals appear to be of reasonable size and do not di¤er in any systematic way.
23 In contrast, Hejazi and Pauly (2005) nd a negative e¤ect of NAFTA on U.S. FDI in Canada and no e¤ect
(see the statistically insignicant coe¢ cients for Canada) for other countriesFDI in Canada. However, as discussed
above, due to their di¤erences in methodology and sample, their results are not strictly comparable to ours.
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similar across our di¤erent specications except in the NAFTA cases for bilateral Canadian-U.S.
FDI when we allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, where the coe¢ cients are much
larger. Even though this method worked well for Bertrand et al.s (2004) data, it may not be the
case here. For example, consider the average estimated autocorrelation in regressions (1) through
(4). It is about 0.85, much higher than in Bertrand et al.s data, where the true autocorrelation
is comparable to our estimated one in magnitude. Moreover, they do not allow for individual (in
our case: country-pair specic) autocorrelation coe¢ cients, but impose a common one. Thus, we
maintain that our Prais-Winsten methodology is appropriate and yields good results.
We perform one more important robustness check by re-estimating the model using the Barro/Lee
education data rather than the ILO skill data. Results are presented in Tables 5 and 6, which con-
tain the same specications as Tables 3 and 4, without the no controlsone of course. The signs
and signicance levels of all control variables are virtually the same, including the coe¢ cients on
the Barro/Lee education measures. Turning to the CUSFTA and NAFTA e¤ects, we note that
virtually all results hold up qualitatively. There are some di¤erences in the magnitudes of the
coe¢ cients, though they do not appear to systematically di¤er in one direction or the other and
not by much.
In summary, we nd that there is ample evidence that North American economic integration
rst with CUSFTA and then including Mexico in NAFTA has a¤ected FDI both in and from
Canada, the small Northern country in the agreements. The e¤ect is positive for intra-NAFTA
FDI except that Canadian FDI in Mexico is negatively a¤ected. Although other countriesFDI in
Canada has also fallen relative to general trends and what is to be expected from the evolution of
the traditional determinants of FDI, the results suggest that economic integration with low-cost
countries need not strictly divert FDI away from a small higher-cost member country.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the e¤ect of North American integration on Canadian foreign direct
investment (FDI), both inward and outward. The empirical results suggest that CUSFTA alone
did not have a positive e¤ect, perhaps because it was quickly followed by the inclusion of Mexico
into NAFTA. The larger agreement is found to have had a positive e¤ect on Canadian FDI in the
U.S. and Canadian inward FDI from the U.S., though a negative e¤ect on other countriesFDI in
Canada and Canadian FDI in Mexico. The results are consistent with a theory of trade agreements
lowering not just trade, but investment costs, which results in greater foreign engagement of some
rms, su¢ cient to generate a positive e¤ect in aggregate data.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that combines U.S., Mexican and bilateral OECD FDI
data to analyze the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canada. Together with the results from our companion
paper, which found substantial increases in the wake of NAFTA of U.S. FDI in Mexico and no
positive e¤ect on non-NAFTA FDI in either the U.S. or Mexico, we obtain a comprehensive picture
of how North American integration with its coincident reduction in investment costs a¤ects FDI in
the region. Clearly, it encourages intra-regional FDI, although to the detriment of third-country
FDI.
The results are robust to di¤erent econometric specications, the nature of the data and the
sample. More importantly, while we cannot claim to cleanly isolate a CUSFTA or NAFTA e¤ect
given that it is impossible to control for all other events that occur during this time period, the
nature of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation and an attempt to control at least for the commonly
recognized determinants of FDI make us feel condent about the results.
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Note: C(pm; pa)  c(pm; pa)=(1 ) and TH = (tH)=(1 ) and TL = (tL)=(1 ) are transformed
measures of the unit and trade costs, respectively.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
14+ observations 5+ observations
Regressor Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
FDI (000 $) 7,856 986.0 22,262 4,132 247.0 15,515
GDP Host (mill. $) 2,064 626.2 2,892 1,336 366.5 2,392
GDP Source (mill. $) 1,579 642.7 2,388 1,152 308.1 2,140
Skill Host - ILO (share) 0.258 0.285 0.102 0.261 0.285 0.103
Skill Source - ILO (share) 0.280 0.298 0.096 0.287 0.306 0.101
Skill Host - Barro/Lee (years) 8.384 8.483 2.635 8.333 8.684 2.577
Skill Source - Barro/Lee (years) 8.795 9.007 2.265 8.289 8.706 2.615
Real Exchange Rate (index) 99.64 99.01 35.14 126.9 100.0 897.9
Host Openness (%) 59.70 44.22 60.73 72.07 59.02 64.18
Source Openness (%) 60.20 50.58 50.59 73.27 62.22 58.23
Distance (km) 7,205 6,855 4,705 7,088 6,923 4,888
CUSFTA 0.268 0 0.443 0.197 0 0.398
NAFTA 0.469 0 0.499 0.676 1 0.468
UShostCan 0.007 0 0.083 0.003 0 0.056
MexhostCan 0.007 0 0.083 0.003 0 0.056
CanhostUS 0.006 0 0.079 0.003 0 0.053
CanhostOther 0.061 0 0.239 0.040 0 0.196
Notes:
CUSFTA and NAFTA are indicator variables for the CUSFTA only (1989-93) and NAFTA
(1994 on) time periods.
UShostCan, MexhostCan, CanhostUS and CanhostOther are indicator variables for the four
host types discussed in the text, where Can = Canada, US = United States, Mex = Mexico and
other = countries other than Mexico and the United States.
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Table 3: Regression Results: ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE
GDP Host 5.700*** 5.468*** 5.564*** 5.717***
(1.125) (0.585) (1.085) (1.790)
GDP Source 4.366*** 2.774*** 4.305*** 2.708***
(0.473) (0.319) (0.463) (0.866)
Skill Host 47,476*** 23,761*** 45,430*** 23,948**
(9,650) (3,159) (9,183) (9,965)
Skill Source 37,136*** 19,759*** 36,174*** 36,710**
(8,787) (3,405) (8,829) (15,042)
Real Exchange Rate 0.355 0.0004 1.462 -25.15
(4.786) (0.019) (4.932) (16.11)
Host Openness 17.15*** 10.68*** 16.91** 6.367
(6.502) (1.835) (7.008) (8.664)
Source Openness -32.38* -12.46*** -32.58* -25.17
(18.44) (3.807) (18.78) (19.57)
Distance -0.782*** -0.289*** -0.788*** -0.305*
(0.169) (0.046) (0.168) (0.161)
CUSFTA (1) -1,121 -669.5 -83.76 -337.8 -1,418
(987.2) (1,023) (924.6) (1,294) (923.6)
NAFTA (2) -662.2 -673.3 -468.3 -608.2 -2,478**
(988.4) (1,020) (496.5) (1,039) (1,090)
UShostCan ( 1) 28,331*** -8,215 -4,663 -6,825 -10,032
(7,419) (8,997) (7,503) (10,272) (9,213)
MexhostCan ( 2) -618.9 5,251*** 1,217 5,211*** 2,771
(1,446) (1,674) (1,144) (1,835) (1,808)
CanhostUS ( 3) 68,005*** 36,910*** 49,511*** 37,383*** 45,808***
(7,406) (6,762) (6,918) (8,177) (4,622)
CanhostOther ( 4) -3,212** 556.0 -1,162 402.4 1,785
(1,481) (1,369) (1,108) (1,660) (1,968)
Number of obs. 3,317 3,317 7,357 3,317 3,317
R2 0.21 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.31
Average autocorr. 0.872 0.852 0.859 0.852 N/A
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend and dummies for non-NAFTA
country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions
with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 4, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(4) correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are
estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text
for details. Regression (5) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix.
All regressions except (3) contain at least 14 observations for each country pair.
In Regression (4), the CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies are set equal to one starting in 1987 and 1992,
respectively
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Table 4: CUSFTA and NAFTA E¤ects, ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 11,052 5,493 8,295 6,777 2,567
UShostCan (1 + 11) (7,939) (6,969) (7,248) (7,060) (3,045)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 12,174 6,162 8,379 7,115 3,985
UShostCan ( 11) (8,011) (6,944) (6,975) (7,215) (2,958)
Simple Di¤erence -5,876*** -5,666*** -2,203*** -4,435*** -6,266***
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (1,493) (1,178) (564.3) (1,166) (1,688)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,755*** -4,997*** -2,119** -4,097*** -4,848***
MexhostCan ( 12) (1,521) (1,285) (901.4) (1,471) (1,173)
Simple Di¤erence 10,225 5,112 9,529 9,391 3,546*
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (8,060) (7,434) (8,086) (7,638) (1,967)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 11,347 5,782 9,613 9,729 4,963**
CanhostUS ( 13) (7,809) (7,042) (7,545) (7,425) (2,040)
Simple Di¤erence -4,026*** -4,560*** -1,858*** -3,283** -4,371***
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (1,422) (1,173) (440.8) (1,375) (1,476)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -2,905* -3,891*** -1,775* -2,945** -2,953**
CanhostOther ( 14) (1,555) (1,288) (1,021) (1,447) (1,351)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 13,182* 8,845 10,646 5,113 22,277***
UShostCan (2 + 21) (7,939) (6,970) (7,238) (6,974) (3,499)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 13,845* 9,518 11,114 5,722 24,755***
UShostCan ( 21) (8,015) (6,941) (7,310) (7,012) (3,300)
Simple di¤erence -4,333*** -2,602** -243.1 -3,545*** -2,392**
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (1,527) (1,239) (566.8) (1,303) (1,211)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,671** -1,348 225.2 -2,937** 86.49
MexhostCan ( 22) (1,563) (1,733) (584.1) (1,385) (866.6)
Simple di¤erence 13,183* 9,865 13,546* 3,077 21,832***
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,880) (7,275) (7,846) (7,301) (1,906)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 13,846* 10,538 14,014* 3,685 24,310***
CanhostUS ( 23) (7,599) (6,834) (7,731) (6,921) (3,464)
Simple di¤erence -5,328*** -3,415*** -1,322*** -3,553*** -5,140***
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (1,510) (1,074) (428.4) (1,327) (1,394)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,665*** -2,742** -853.6* -2,945** -2,662***
CanhostOther ( 24) (1,616) (1,221) (479.5) (1,351) (901.9)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Table 2.
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Table 5: Regression Results: Barro/Lee Education Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regressor 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary
obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE
GDP Host 5.481*** 4.330*** 5.287*** 5.316***
(1.001) (0.415) (0.960) (1.345)
GDP Source 4.206*** 1.924*** 4.155*** 2.573***
(0.443) (0.216) (0.434) (0.764)
Skill Host (Barro/Lee) 1,680*** 1,068*** 1,655*** 786.7**
(467.4) (167.5) (452.5) (321.2)
Skill Source (Barro/Lee) 1,200*** 746.1*** 1,212*** 1,036***
(251.4) (119.9) (265.1) (324.7)
Real Exchange Rate -2.138 0.0004 -1.315 -23.53*
(3.518) (0.0005) (3.615) (14.01)
Host Openness 28.20*** 18.15*** 25.87*** 11.64*
(9.143) (2.054) (8.647) (6.642)
Source Openness -8.101 -8.301** -10.01 -6.863
(12.25) (3.909) (12.87) (14.99)
Distance -1.193*** -0.615*** -1.192*** -0.585***
(0.220) (0.093) (0.220) (0.160)
CUSFTA (1) -649.1 -216.5 -467.2 -1,559**
(916.3) (863.6) (1,183) (693.3)
NAFTA (2) -464.3 -340.4 -604.4 -2,018**
(847.0) (346.2) (849.9) (816.3)
UShostCan ( 1) -15,182* -4,059 -13,062 -12,781*
(9,226) (7,534) (10,559) (7,667)
MexhostCan ( 2) 1,758 -229.3 2,156 116.0
(1,316) (1,165) (1,520) (1,344)
CanhostUS ( 3) 30,997*** 49,058*** 31,990*** 42,020***
(7,122) (7,068) (8,506) (4,780)
CanhostOther ( 4) -2,140 -2,434** -1,727 876.6
(1,979) (1,242) (1,874) (1,969)
Number of obs. 4,419 10,289 4,419 4,419
R2 0.31 0.24 0.29 0.30
Average autocorr. 0.852 0.862 0.852 N/A
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend and dummies for non-NAFTA
country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions
with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 6, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(3) correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are
estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text
for details. Regression (4) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix.
All regressions except (2) contain at least 14 observations for each country pair.
In Regression (3), the CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies are set equal to one starting in 1987 and 1992,
respectively
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Table 6: CUSFTA and NAFTA E¤ects, Barro/Lee Education Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary
obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 7,655 10,572 7,426 5,688***
UShostCan (1 + 11) (6,913) (7,545) (7,059) (1,957)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 8,304 10,789 7,893 7,247***
UShostCan ( 11) (6,990) (7,313) (7,293) (1,869)
Simple Di¤erence -5,520*** -2,347*** -4,645*** -4,647***
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (1,295) (563.2) (1,232) (988.2)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,871*** -2,131** -4,178*** -3,088***
MexhostCan ( 12) (1,399) (917.6) (1,503) (750.2)
Simple Di¤erence 7,702 11,594 10,014 5,358***
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (7,278) (8,255) (7,560) (1,261)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 8,351 11,811 10,481 6,916***
CanhostUS ( 13) (6,952) (7,759) (7,424) (1,210)
Simple Di¤erence -1,590 -333.2 -1,882* -2,756**
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (1,034) (608.0) (1,045) (1,088)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -970.8 -116.7 -1,415 -1,197
CanhostOther ( 14) (1,039) (912.2) (1,091) (920.2)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 8,701 11,936 5,608 22,408***
UShostCan (2 + 21) (6,895) (7,551) (6,947) (2,931)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 9,165 12,276 6,213 24,426***
UShostCan ( 21) (7,041) (7,678) (7,162) (2,654)
Simple di¤erence -3,933*** -763.4 -4,848*** -3,233***
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (1,331) (557.6) (1,360) (1,057)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,469** -422.9 -4,244*** -1,215*
MexhostCan ( 22) (1,400) (546.9) (1,445) (630.2)
Simple di¤erence 9,515 14,290* 3,416 21,892***
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,052) (8,006) (7,124) (1,693)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 9,979 14,630* 4,020 23,910***
CanhostUS ( 23) (6,772) (7,952) (6,916) (1,485)
Simple di¤erence -2,442** -958.6** -2,370** -3,994***
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (1,107) (480.3) (1,127) (1,100)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -1,976* -618.2 -1,766* -1,975**
CanhostOther ( 24) (1,067) (461.2) (1,059) (863.2)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Table 4.
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Figure 1: Pre-CUSFTA integration strategies
Figure 2: CUSFTA integration strategies
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Figure 3: NAFTA integration strategies
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Figure 4: Canadian Inward and Outward Real FDI Stock, $millions
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